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MEDIA SEARCHES AFTER ZURCHER v. STANFORD DAILY: A STATUTORY APPROACH
INTRODUCTION

On Friday, April 9, 1971, members of the Palo Alto Police
Department and the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department were called to Stanford University Hospital to remove a
group of demonstrators that had seized the hospital administrative offices and occupied them since the previous afternoon,
barricading the doors at both ends of the corridor adjacent to
the administrative offices. Failing to convince the demonstrators to leave peacefully, the police forced their way into the
offices held by the demonstrators. While the majority of police
were entering the west end of the corridor, a group of demonstrators charged through the doors at the east end and attacked nine officers stationed there, injuring all nine. There
were no police photographers at the east end of the corridor;
most of the newspersons and bystanders present were at the
west end of the hallway. Only two of the assailants could be
identified by the nine officers themselves.1
A special edition of the Stanford University student
newspaper, The Stanford Daily, was published Sunday, April
11, containing photographs and articles about the hospital
protest. The content of the photographs, credited to a Daily
staff member, suggested they had been taken at the east end
of the hospital corridor during the Friday incident.2
The following day, the Santa Clara County District Attorney's office obtained a warrant for the immediate search of
the Daily's premises for negatives, film, and pictures of the
hospital incident. The warrant was issued on probable cause
that negatives, film, and pictures showing demonstrators who
assaulted the police officers, would be found in the newspaper
offices. The warrant affidavit did not assert that any member
of the newspaper staff had participated in the unlawful acts at
© 1980 by Stephanie Ann Christie.
1. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 550-51 (1978).
2. Id. at 551.
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the hospital. 3
Pursuant to the search warrant, the Daily's photographic
laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and wastepaper baskets
were searched. During the search, the officers had the opportunity to view notes taken by reporters that contained information obtained from sources in confidence with the understanding that the name of the source would not be disclosed.
The officers also saw or read business and personal correspondence of the Daily and its staff. No materials relevant to the
hospital incident were found other than the photographs that
had already been published on April 11; nothing was removed
from the newspaper offices."
The search described above is an example of a dozen that
have been conducted in California in recent years 5 and is indicative of an expanding practice.' The use of search warrants
to seize material from the press is an issue that has been
much in the news and in the courts in recent years, raising the
question of how the interests of society in a free press are to
be balanced against the public interest in effective and efficient law enforcement.
This comment explores in part how this balancing has
been approached in the area of media searches. In the case of
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,7 the United States Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the fourth amendment establishes
special requirements for search warrants that are issued to
search for material in possession of one not suspected of a
crime. In so holding, the Court declined to recognize any special privilege for newspapers or other media that might be
3. Id.
4. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
5. Justice Department Policy Concerning News Media Search Warrants:
Hearing Before A Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. app. 6 (1978) (letter by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press). Police obtained search warrants for the following press facilities since the
search of the Daily offices: October 1973, Berkeley Barb, Berkeley; February 1974,
Berkeley Barb, Berkeley; March 1974, KPFA-FM, Berkeley; June 1974, Berkeley
Barb, Berkeley; June 1974, Phoenix, San Francisco; October 1974, KPFK-FM, Los
Angeles; October 1974, KPOO-FM,San Francisco; October 1974, L.A. Star, Los Angeles; December 1977, KRON-TV, San Francisco; December 1977, KTVU-TV, San
Francisco; December 1977, KGO-TV, San Francisco; December 1977, KPIX-TV,
Oakland.
6. The Highest Court, The Toughest Issues, THE STANFORD MAGAZINE, Fall/
Winter 1978, at 35 (an interview with Gerald Gunther) (on file at the Santa Clara
Law Review).
7. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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searched by law enforcement officials pursuant to a warrant.'
There are, however, significant problems with police
searches of the media." In recognition of these problems, Cali8. Id. at 567.
Newspersons and the courts have continually clashed over the right of newspersons to protect their confidential sources. The major United States Supreme Court
case dealing with this problem is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The
Branzburg Court held that newspersons did not have an absolute first amendment
privilege against subpoenas that sought information regarding their confidential
sources.
The argument has been made that after Branzburg the press enjoys no greater
constitutional protection than do ordinary citizens. Justice White, however, speaking
for the majority in Branzburg, noted the Court limited its holding to grand jury proceedings and a reporter's right to withhold information. Id. at 682. Furthermore, the
Court recognized that the news gathering process merited at least limited first
amendment protection. Id. at 681. Acknowledging the existence of such a right forced
the Court to take a balancing approach to the first amendment, weighing the public
interest in the news gathering potential of confidential source relationships against
the public interest in apprehending criminals. Id. at 690-702. The Court concluded
that while disclosing confidential sources may infringe on first amendment rights in
news gathering, under the specific facts before the Court, the public need for controlling crime outweighed the injury to first amendment interests.
Because the majority opinion in Branzburg was narrow and riddled with qualifications, the question remained as to whether reporters possessed a first amendment
right to withhold confidential information from law enforcement officers with a valid
search warrant. It was not until the Zurcher decision that this issue was resolved.
9. Media searches normally involve "third party" searches: the reporter whose
property is seized is not suspected of criminal activity but merely possesses information concerning criminal suspects. This does not mean that reporters are excluded
from constitutional protection. Rather, third parties not suspected of crimes are entitled to the same fourth amendment protections as are suspects. "This [fourth amendment] guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
the innocent and guilty alike." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
In order for official conduct to come within the scope of constitutional protection,
there first must be a determination that the conduct is a search or seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Prior to 1967, the amendment's protection turned
upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area. This protected area concept was discarded in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). In excluding evidence of the petitioner's end of phone conversations overheard by FBI agents using an electronic listening device attached to a phone booth,
the Court observed:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . [But] what he seeks to
preserve as private, even if in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351. Justice Harlan, writing a concurring opinion in Katz that has been treated
as if it were the majority view (See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United
States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84, 453 P.2d 721, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969)), stated that the
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fornia recently amended its Penal Code to minimize the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher as applied to
press searches. 10 This new legislation will be analyzed below in
terms of what are perceived to be its benefits and failings. Finally, an alternative legislative approach at the federal level
will be suggested that would better serve the interests
involved."1
LEGAL HISTORY OF

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily

One month after the search of its newsroom, the Stanford
Daily and members of its staff brought a civil rights action2
under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code 8 to
protection of the fourth amendment attaches if an individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). Consequently, because
the sanctity of a person's home or office and privacy are the controlling considerations in fourth amendment anaylsis, the rights of third parties to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures are afforded full constitutional status.
When there is a showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the fourth
amendment requires that a search warrant be secured upon a showing of probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a
crime will be found. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Furthermore, the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. Id.
Traditionally, the "mere evidence" rule prohibited the issuance of a search warrant that commanded the seizure of mere evidence. In 1967, the Supreme Court abolished this rule in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), insofar as it allowed a
search for evidence of a crime based on probable cause and a proper warrant. The
Court reserved judgment as to some items of evidentiary value "whose very nature
precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure", id. at 303,
because their very nature requires the owner to become a witness against himself. In
addition, Warden did not decide the issue of whether searches for mere evidence of a
crime believed to be possessed by innocent third parties required special justification.
In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the Court resolved the first issue by
finding that a search and seizure, pursuant to a valid warrant, of business records in
the defendant's possession, some of which were "testimonial" in nature, did not violate the fifth amendment. The second issue was left unresolved until the Zurcher
decision allowed third party searches upon a finding of probable cause that the person possessed evidence of a crime.
Finally, it should be noted that very few cases deal with the fourth amendment
rights of innocent third parties because these persons do not usually object to
searches and seizures when they are not suspected of criminal activity. In addition,
this paucity of cases may be attributable to the fact that law enforcement officials
often rely upon the subpoena duces tecum, rather than a search warrant to secure
desired information. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. at 127-28.
10. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 72-83 and accompanying text infra.
12. 436 U.S. at 552.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
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have the search declared illegal and unconstitutional. The
plaintiffs claimed the search of the Daily's office deprived
them, under color of state law, of rights secured to them by
the first, fourth, and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution. In addition to declaratory relief, the
plaintiffs also sought an injunction to prevent similar police
14
conduct in the future.

Federal District Court Judge Robert Peckham refused to
grant injunctive relief, but on summary judgment for the
plaintiffs found the search unconstitutional and granted declaratory relief. In so doing, Judge Peckham rejected the
traditional search warrant procedure as "unreasonable per
se" 1 5 when employed against non-suspects. The trial court

held that the fourth and fourteenth amendments barred the
issuance of a warrant to search for materials in possession of
one not suspected of a crime unless there is probable cause to
believe, based on facts presented in a sworn affidavit, that a
subpoena duces tecum' 6 would be impracticable. 17
The lower court further held that when the object of the
search is a newspaper, first amendment considerations require
that a search warrant will be permitted "only in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1) important
materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction,
and (2) a restraining order would be futile.""8 These preconditions were not satisfied in the search of the Daily's offices,
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for
redress.
Jurisdiction was founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) which reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person.
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by an Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States.
14. 353 F. Supp. at 126.
15. Id. at 127.
16. See text accompanying notes 73-76 infra.
17. 353 F. Supp. at 127.
18. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).
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and therefore the search was illegal.19 The Ninth Circuit 2af0
firmed per curiam, adopting the District Court's opinion.
The United States Supreme Court, in a five to three decision reversing the lower court,' 1 held there is no constitutional
requirement that resort to a subpoena duces tecum be shown
impractical before a search warrant may issue even though the
owner or possessor of the place22 to be searched is not suspected of criminal involvement.
Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected the notion that fourth amendment 3 protections vary depending on
the character of the search victim. In the Court's view, Judge
revision ' 24 of fourth
Peckham's holding was a "sweeping
amendment law:
Under existing law, valid warrants may be issued to
search any property, whether or not occupied by a third
party, at which there is probable cause to believe that
fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime may be
found.
[T]he District Court's holding appears to be that state
entitlement to a search warrant depends on the culpability of the owner or possessor of the place to be searched
state's right to arrest him. The cases are to the
and on the
23
contrary.
In light of the foregoing, Justice White concluded constitutional rights would not be violated if a search of third parties
has been conducted pursuant to a valid warrant issued on
probable cause and the warrant correctly specifies the area to
be searched and the property to be seized.28
Turning to the first amendment issues, the Court rejected
the argument that the amendment requires a subpoena duces
tecum rather than the more intrusive search procedure when
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
Justice Brennan did not take part in the opinion. 436 U.S. at 547, 548.
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
24. 436 U.S. at 554.
25. Id. at 554-55 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 556.
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the premises to be searched are media offices. In the Court's
view, the framers of the Constitution, aware of the importance
of a free press, did not insist that warrants issued for search
of press facilities meet a greater burden than the test of reasonableness and the requirement that warrants be issued by a
neutral magistrate.2 7 The Court found that the preconditions
for a warrant "should afford sufficient protection against the
harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices. "28
The Court emphasized, however, that where "the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the first amendment, the requirements of the fourth amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude'."29 To illustrate, the Court
cited the case of Stanford v. Texass0 where it held a warrant
authorizing the search of a home for all books and materials
relating to the Communist Party was invalid because the
warrant was equivalent to a general warrant, leaving the extensiveness of the search to the whim of the officer executing
the warrant. According to the Court, the warrant requirement
should be administered so as to leave as little discretion to the
officer in the field as possible. As another example, the Court
cited Marcus v. Search Warrant"' where it stated that the
Constitution requires a procedure "designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity" so that when warrants are
sought for the seizure of allegedly obscene material, the arresting officer is not allowed to rely merely on his own judgment of what is obscene. 2
Finding that the preconditions for a warrant-probable
cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and
the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness-had been
satisfied, the Court concluded that the search for photographs
27. Id. at 565.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 564 (citing Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) that held the
particularity requirement is to be given "the most scrupulous exactitude when the

'things' (to be seized] are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas they
contain.").
30.

379 U.S. 476 (1965).

31. 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (Missouri statutes and rulings of the state supreme
court violated due process under the fourteenth amendment when a warrant for the
search and seizure of obscene material could issue upon assertion of single officer that
the material was in fact obscene).
32. Id. at 732.
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at the Daily was not unreasonable within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, nor had the first amendment been violated. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the
lower courts. 3
Justice Stewart, joined in dissent by Justice Marshall,
found no violation of the fourth amendment but believed the
search of the Daily infringed on the first and fourteenth
amendments' guarantee of a free press."' In Stewart's view,
unannounced press searches would burden the freedom of the
press in that such searches would cause "physical disruption
of the operation of the newspaper." 85 An even more serious
burden, in Stewart's mind, was the "possibility of disclosure
of information received from confidential sources, or of the
identity of the sources themselves." 8 As a result, Stewart concluded that unannounced police searches of newspaper offices
infringed on the "constitutionally protected function of the
8' 7
press to gather news and report it to the public.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens based
his disagreement with the majority entirely on the "innocent
third party" issue. Justice Stevens argued that mere documentary evidence in the possession of such a third party
should be sought by subpoena. In this case, because the Daily
was an innocent third party not involved in any wrongdoing,
there was no justification for the search and it was therefore
88
unreasonable and unconstitutional.
THE INTERESTS INVOLVED IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE

When there is a search of press facilities, as in the
Zurcher case, significant interests come into conflict: those of
government, the press, and the public.
Governmental Interests in Law Enforcement
The primary function of law enforcement is the investigation and prosecution of crime to insure "security for the person and property of the individual" from "reprehensible con33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

436 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 570-71.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 577-83.
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duct forbidden to all other persons."3 9 A search is a highly
effective tool to facilitate this function. Furnishing efficient
means of obtaining such evidence of criminal activity as narcotics, contraband, or weapons, searches arguably prevent future crimes as well as help convict the guilty. To the extent
police are denied the use of search warrants, the prosecution
of crime could become more difficult and expensive.40
Law enforcement agencies obviously have an interest insuring that evidence sought is not destroyed or removed beyond jurisdictional reach. Because a search warrant may be
obtained swiftly, anyone disposed to destroying or removing
evidence would have less time to do so where this technique is
employed.
Press and Public Interests
While compatible with governmental interests in acquiring information about criminal activity, media searches collide
with important interests of the press and society.
An officer executing a valid warrant may search any place
the items named in the warrant might be located.4 1 Assuming
that the object of a newsroom search will most often be documents and that the police will generally not know the layout
of a reporter's office, police will have access to virtually all information in the reporter's possession. Consequently, the police may view highly confidential information. This is illustrated by the Daily incident where, during the course of their
search, officers scrutinized reporters' notes containing information that was obtained by reporters in exchange for their
promise that neither the information nor the source would be
revealed.42
Knowing police may gain access to confidential files
through the use of a search warrant, potential confidential
sources will justifiably fear exposure; they will be discouraged
from passing information to the press, having a dramatic effect on the media's news gathering function. As one commentator suggests:
39. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690, 692 (1972).
40. See Liebman, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory Fourth
Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 957, 973-74 (1976).
41. See generally 68 AM. JUR. 2d, Searches and Seizures §§ 84-88 (1973).
42. See note 4 and accompanying text infra.
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[T]he fabric of journalism on a daily basis is so intertwined with obtaining information of a confidential nature that permitting police to search through newsrooms
jeopardizes the relationship of every reporter in the newsroom and virtually every person he has talked to; and so
undermines the independence and credibility of the press
that it would be virtually impossible to operate
effectively. 8
Media searches not only affect the newsgathering function of the press but also the media's news disseminating
function. Searches may take several hours. For example, in
1974, police conducted an eight-hour search. of radio station
KPFK-FM in Los Angeles for a New World Liberation Front
"communique" regarding a recent bombing. 44 The presence of
officers for extended periods of time rummaging through files,
listening to tapes, and looking through reporters' notes must
necessarily have an adverse effect on the normal functioning
of the newsroom. Further, reporters might refrain from investigating controversial matters so as to insure that they are not
made the subject of official searches, while editors might be
unwilling to run stories that would invite police searches.45
When newgathering and dissemination are impeded as a
result of newsroom searches, ultimately the American public
suffers because our ability to receive information and ideas is
impaired. Moreover, the press' historical function has been to
expose corruption and misdeeds in the political arena. Serious
questions as to the press' ability to investigate government
arise when a local magistrate, an integral part of the political
structure, can issue warrants for searches of newsrooms. Media searches also collide with journalists' legitimate privacy
interests. In the Daily search, police read personal correspondence of the Daily and its staff members. It has been suggested that
[m]embers of the press, like participants in other businesses, enjoy constitutionally protected expectations of
privacy concerning their media facilities, as well as their
homes. Journalists ... have personal files, memoranda
43. Statement by Jack C. Landau, Publisher's Weekly, June 1978.
44. See Confidentiality/State Executive-No Notice Police Raids, 7 PRESS
CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER 11-12 (1975); Confidentiality of News Media Sources: State
Executive, 6 PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER 30 (1975).
45. See Liebman, supra note 40, at 957, 986.
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and numerous compilations of confidential information
which they are constitutionally entitled to shelter from
governmental intrusion, even if the business institution
6
rather than the individual technically owns the items.4
A

STATUTORY APPROACH

The Zurcher Court made clear that the above-mentioned
interests of the press and the public with respect to searches
are not protected by the first, fourth, and fourteenth amendments. In its decision, however, the Court virtually invited
legislation in the area of media searches:
Of course the Fourth Amendment does not prevent or advise against legislative or executive efforts to establish
nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses of
the search warrant procedure, but we decline to reinterpret the Amendment to impose a general constitutional
barrier against warrants to search newspaper premises, to
require resorts to subpoenas as a general rule, or to demand prior notice and hearing in connection with the is47
suance of search warrants.
California Legislation
In the wake of Zurcher, the California Legislature acted
to create statutory protections for the news media by amending section 1524 of the Penal Code 4 8 to prohibit the use of
warrants for newsroom searches. Under section 1524, as
amended, search warrants shall not be issued "for any item or
items described in Section 1070 of the Evidence Code." 4 9 The
cross-reference is to California's so-called shield law, that
gives statutory protection to a newsperson, stating that the
latter cannot be adjudged in contempt by any judicial, legislative, or administrative body for refusal to reveal a confidential
source or unpublished information.5 0
In interpreting Penal Code section 1524, the first inquiry
necessarily must be who is given protection and what materi46. Id. at 972.
47. 436 U.S. at 567.
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(c) (West Supp. 1979). The amended section provides: "No warrant shall issue for any item or items described in Section 1070 of the
Evidence Code."
49. Id.
50. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1979).
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als are protected under the shield law. Originally, Evidence
Code section 1070 provided protections for publishers, editors,
reporters, or other persons connected with or employed by a
newspaper. In 1962, the protection was extended to employees
of radio and television stations, press associations, and wire
services. Then, in 1971, the statute was amended to provide
protection for information received by a newsperson who had
ceased to be so employed. Finally, those employed by
magazines or other periodicals were brought under the shield
law by a 1974 amendment."
All "unpublished information" receives immunity under
Evidence Code section 1070. Unpublished 'information, for
purposes of this immunity, is defined in subdivision (c) of the
section:
As used in this section, "unpublished information" includes information not disseminated to the public by the
person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not
related information has been disseminated and includes,
but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs,
tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication
whether or not published information based upon or related to such material has been disseminated."2
In light of the foregoing, Penal Code section 1524 can be
read as prohibiting the issuance of warrants for any newsperson's unpublished information. In recent judicial decisions,
however, courts have been unwilling to apply the shield law
without balancing other interests. Most often, the competing
interest has been held strong enough to strike the balance in
favor of disclosure by the press. 8
In Rosato v. Superior Court,54 the Fresno Bee had published a copy of a sealed grand jury transcript after the grand
jury had indicted a councilman, a land developer, and the former city planning commissioner on counts of bribery and con51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Farr v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60,
99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
54. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976).
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spiracy.5 Following the publication, the court began proceedings to determine who had violated its order sealing the
transcript.5 Rosato, the reporter who had obtained the transcript, testified he had not received the document from a person subject to the court's order.0 1 Nonetheless, the trial court
went ahead and questioned court officers who had lawful access to the transcript."
The court of appeal held that the trial court had both the
authority to issue the order and the authority to investigate
possible violations of its order. The court further held, under
the facts of the case, that the defendants' right to a fair trial
outweighed any federal or state constitutional privilege. Applying the rationale of Branzburg v. Hayes, the court stated
that "the right to require such testimony in an investigation
growing out of the violation of an order which goes to the
right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is irrefutable. '" 60
The court also weighed the importance of the integrity of the
judicial process against the right of a newsperson not to reveal
sources, and when the balance was struck, the court found
against the right to refuse disclosure."
In another recent case, CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court," the
court of appeal held that provisions of Evidence Code section
1070 did not apply to a television network's unpublished
video and audio tapes. The decision was based both on the
network's failure to show what material, if any, from so-called
"outtakes" had not already been disclosed" and on the finding that the failure to require disclosure would directly impair
the defendants' right to a fair trial. Again balancing the interests involved, the court found against the press' desire not to
reveal confidential information. 4
The two cases illustrate that Evidence Code section 1070
does not provide absolute immunity to newspersons from con55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
right to
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 199, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
Id. at 201, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
Id. at 203, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
Id. at 202, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that reporters possess no first amendment
withhold confidential information from grand juries).
51 Cal. App. 3d at 213, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
Id. at 214 n.13, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 443 n.13.
85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 149 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1978).
Id. at 250, 149 Cal. Rptr, at 426.
Id. at 252, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
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tempt citations for willful nondisclosure. Since the courts
have refused to apply section 1070 without balancing other in-

terests including the interest in a defendant's right to a fair
trial and the interest in the integrity of the court process, the
net effect of Penal Code section 1524 as amended is
uncertain."'
RESOLUTION BY FEDERAL LEGISLATION

FederalLegislation is Desireable
A number of bills have been introduced in Congress to

curtail the effects of the Zurcher decision. 6 ' The Carter Administration recently proposed legislation to protect newsrooms from unannounced searches. 61 In addition, the United
States Department of Justice in an amicus curiae brief filed
in Zurcher, argued that news organizations should be exempt
from searches:
[I]t can fairly be supposed that federal law enforcement
efforts would not be seriously hampered by a decision of
this Court approving the "subpoena first" rule of the
courts below in the limited context of searches of the
press as a neutral "third party" believed to be in posses65. It could be argued that the balance struck in the courts' decisions interpreting Evidence Code section 1070 was dependent upon the particular interests involved
in those cases. However, where the interest in confidentiality of sources and information is to be balanced against the government's interest in the investigation of criminal activity through media searches, courts might be willing to read Section 1070
more expansively. In that case, it is possible that a balancing test will not be employed or a balance would be struck in favor of nondisclosure.
Of course the converse is also a possibility: the courts may decide that warrants
will issue for media searches under certain circumstances, just as under certain circumstances newspersons have had to disclose sources and unpublished information. If
this possibility is realized, it is unclear at this point precisely what circumstances
would merit the issuance of a warrant for a media search in California.
It has been suggested that newspersons might enjoy a common law privilege similar to those protecting an attorney-client and husband-wife relationship. The fight for
a common law privilege, however, has been almost futile. See, e.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (assertion of common law privilege by the
Associated Press denied in a defamation action against the wire service); People v.
Sheriff of New York County, 268 N.Y. 582, 199 N.E. 415 (1936) (newsman jailed for
contempt after he refused to reveal his sources for a story he wrote regarding a grand
jury probe into gambling and lottery rackets).
66. See, e.g., H.R. 12952, H.R. 13017, H.R. 13113, H.R. 13168, H.R. 13169, H.R.
13227, H.R. 13305, H.R. 13319, H.R. 13710, S. 3164, S. 3222, S. 3258, S. 3261, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
67. 47 U.S.L.W. 2431.
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sion of evidence bearing on a criminal investigation.6
Despite the apparent support for federal legislation to
limit media searches, no federal bill has yet been enacted. Enactment of a law at the federal level could have significant
advantages, not the least of which is national uniformity.
Under present law, a California newsperson who steps outside
state boundaries would not enjoy the protections of Penal
Code section 1524, uncertain as those protections might be.
Since newspersons frequently travel in their work, lack of uniformity in protective laws is a substantial concern. Furthermore, if a news source were entangled with a federal offense,
the newsgatherer would be subject to the federal courts' jurisdiction, and any state law limiting media searches would not
necessarily apply. In Lewis v. United States,69 for example,
California Evidence Code section 1070 did not protect the
general manager of a radio station who was held in civil contempt for refusing to comply with a federal grand jury subpoena. The district court held that in a case involving a federal question the court may consider state privilege law but
that "the rule ultimately adopted, whatever its substance, is
not state law but federal common law."'7 0 Seemingly, if section
1070 is not applicable in federal question cases, neither would
be Penal Code section 1524.
A federal law limiting media searches would give newspersons protection independent of the fourth amendment by
imposing sanctions for violations of search warrant limitations. For example, as a general deterrent to improper
searches, a criminal defendant could be awarded standing to
move for exclusion of illegally seized evidence from his or her
trial.7 1 In addition, damages, criminal penalties, or civil fines
68.

Brief of the United States Department of Justice (amicus curiae) at 33-34.

69.

517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975).

70. Id. at 237.
71. As discussed with reference to Zurcher, the use of search warrants to seize
material from the press also raises the issues associated with search of an innocent
third party who merely has possession of information. As such, the newsperson does
not have the protection provided by the exclusionary rule, requiring suppression of
evidence in a criminal trial when the evidence is obtained in violation of constitutional rights. See generally 68 AM. JUR. 2d, Searches and Seizures (1973). The exclu-

sionary rule is circumvented in these circumstances because the evidence seized from
a newsperson is frequently used in a trial against another individual who does not
have standing to challenge the illegal search since standing is conferred only when the
defendant's personal rights are violated. Furthermore, to obtain standing, a defen-

dant must be on the premises at the time of the search, have a proprietary or posses-
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could be imposed.
Provisions of Federal Legislation
A federal law that effectively defines and balances the interests involved in media searches should: 1) require law enforcement officials seeking physical evidence from the press to
to use a subpoena duces tecum; 2) apply to the activities of
federal, state, and local governments; 3) provide protection for
newspersons by defining the terms "newspersons" and "newsgathering" broadly; 4) allow the limited issuance of warrants
in particular specified circumstances; and 5) provide sanctions
for the violations of search warrant limitations.7
Subpoena duces tecum requirement. The proposed legislation should require police to use a subpoena duces tecum to
acquire evidence of criminal activity from media sources. Because a subpoena requires a named person to produce certain
specified items,7 8 it is a less intrusive means of obtaining evidence than a search. The search warrant authorizes police to
enter press facilities to personally search for the materials described in the warrant. Moreover, the search may be conducted outside a newsperson's presence, eliminating the possibility that a cooperative journalist will give the police the
requested materials so the police will not need to search confidential files or records.7 Furthermore, a person faced with a
search warrant has no opportunity to contest the legality of
the search before it occurs, 75 while a person subpoenaed may
move to quash the subpoena by arguing that the information
sought does not exist, is not in his or her possession, or is not
sory interest in the premises, or be charged with an offense that includes possession
of the illegally seized evidence as a necessary element of the crime. Id. In all likelihood, a defendant would not be able to meet these preconditions to standing following a media search. Absent the sanction of exclusion of evidence, the police may not
be deterred from illegal searches with the result that newspersons, as innocent third
parties, become particularly vulnerable to unlawful searches and seizures.
72. The proposed legislation does not address nor affect the California courts'
interpretations of Evidence Code section 1070 as discussed in text accompanying
notes 53-65 supra. It is doubtful that the legislative branch could control that interpretive function in any event.
73. See, e.g., FED. R. CraM. P. 17(c). The section provides, in part, that the
"subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the
books, papers, or documents or other objects desired therein." Id.
74. See generally 68 AM. JuR. 2d Searches and Seizures §§ 84-88 (1973).
75. Id.
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material."'
Applicability to federal, state and local governments.
The no-warrant rule should extend to federal, state, and local
governmental activities. While Congress could clearly restrict
the use of search warrants by federal law enforcement agencies, legislation binding the states is also desirable 77 given that
most search warrants are issued at the state or local level.
Broad definitions of "newsgathering" and "newspersons." The statute should also provide protection from media
searches by broadly defining "newsgathering" to mean any information that has been "obtained or prepared in gathering,
receiving or processing of information for communication to
the public," as now provided by California Evidence Code sec76. See generally 81 AM. JUR. 2d, Witnesses §§ 14-22 (1973).
77. Arguably, such limitations on state and local governments would be unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S..833 (1976). The Court barred imposition of federal minimum wage
standards on state and local government employees, stating: "Congress may not exercise that [commerce clause] power so as to force directly upon the states its choices as
to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions
are to be made." Id. at 855.
In Usery, regulation under the commerce clause required a two-step analysis. See
generally, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 160-63 (1978).
First, there must be a finding that an activity regulated by the federal government is
essential to state sovereignty. The Court did not define the matters that were essential to the state's function, but merely stated that the state's ability to determine its
employees' wages was "an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 426 U.S. at 845.
The court did, however, stress that local governments must have the freedom to determine ways in which they will deliver services to their citizens. Id. at 852.
Once it is found that a federally regulated activity is essential to state sovereignty, the Usery Court analysis then requires a further inquiry as to whether the
particular regulation impaired the activities of the state. Id. The regulation at issue in
Usery limited the choice of the state as to setting the conditions under which their
employees worked and limited their choices as to the delivery of governmental services because it forced the state to make a minimum allocation of resources to certain
employees.
Given the facts of Usery, it may be construed narrowly. Federal regulations may
only be limited when they affect a state's truly governmental activities and when the
regulation also imposes a financial burden on the state. Arguably, the regulation of
the issuance of warrants by a federal law would not be a regulation of a matter directly related to a state's sovereign function and would not place a financial burden
on the states. If this were the case, the commerce clause would provide Congress with
sufficient authority for enacting the proposed legislation.
The fourteenth amendment may also provide Congress with the authority to enforce a no-warrant rule. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the states
from abridging any privilege or immunity and section 5 grants Congress "the power
to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. Assuming first amendment rights are deemed a privilege, the
fourteenth amendment provides a reasonable basis for the law.
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tion 1070.78
"Newsperson" should be defined so that protections could
extend to any person or "legal entity" that gathers or disseminates news through any news medium. Such a definition is
preferable to a definition by a specific list because all
news disseminators should be included on the face of the
statute to preclude uncertainty in the minds of newspersons and hearing
officers as to whether protection has
79
been afforded. '
The term "legal entity" is used to afford protection to partnerships, corporations, and associations that function in this
sphere.
It should be acknowledged that the decision in Zurcher
not only rejected special treatment for the media from police
searches, but also denied special protection to all third parties. The legislation, as proposed, only overrules Zurcher to
the extent that the press will be immune from search warrants
absent special circumstances. The problems involved in third
party searches require special considerations that are outside
the scope of this comment. Nothwithstanding searches of
other innocent parties, as a result of the proposed legislation,
the press is afforded a "preferred status". Such a position,
however, is justifiable given the important press functions of
gathering information, stimulating public discussion, and criticizing government.
Exception to the no-warrant rule. The proposed legislation should contain a limited exception allowing searches
under certain conditions. For example, warrants might issue
for the purpose of searching for and seizing contraband, the
fruits of a crime, or things criminally possessed, or property
that is or has been used as a means of committing a criminal
offense.80 Under this provision the usual procedural requirements in obtaining a search warrant would, of course, have to
be satisfied.
As noted earlier, Judge Peckham suggested in his district
court decision in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher that warrants
78.

CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070(b) (West Supp. 1979).
79. Note, Newsperson's Privilege in California:The Controversy and Solution,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 375, 407 (1977).

80.

Legislation which incorporated these suggestions was recently proposed in

Pennsylvania. See Pennsylvania S.B. 1597 (introduced Sept. 1978, but failed to report

out of committee).
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may issue if there is the possibility of the imminent destruction of evidence."' This exception, rejected here, would conceivably be difficult to limit and could result in a "chilling
effect" the legislation is intended to foreclose. It is possible,
for example, that sources might still be inhibited by the fact
that law enforcement officials could learn their identities
through searches conducted pursuant to this exception. Alternatively, law enforcement officials could rely on statutes that
allow criminal penalties for destruction of evidence."'
Sanctions for violation of search warrant limitations. Finally, liability should be imposed on an agency issuing warrants in violation of the proposed legislation's provisions. Officers signing an affidavit or executing a search that violates
the limitations on searches should also be subject to liability.
Money damages and attorney's fees could be awarded upon a
finding of a violation. Also, standing could be granted the
criminal defendant against whom illegally seized evidence is
being used. 8
CONCLUSION

Media searches present a problem in balancing the interests in a free press against that of effective law enforcement.
While searches facilitate the government's interest in ob81. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
82. Several states have criminal statutes that prohibit the destruction or alteration of evidence by persons who know that such information is needed in pending
investigations or trials. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE 18-2603; NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.220
(1973); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.295 (1971).
83. See SUBCOM. ON GOVERNMENT INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, SEARCH
WARRANTS AND THE EFFECTS OF THE STANFORD DAILY DECISION, H.R. REP. No. 1521,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978).
An application of the proposed federal legislation to the Zurcher facts illustrates
the protection that would result. In Zurcher, police obtained a warrant in an ex parte
proceeding for photographs and film of the hospital incident. Under the proposed
legislation, the Daily, as a newsgathering entity within the definition provided, would
be protected from the search. Consequently, police would have to secure a subpoena

to obtain the desired evidence.
If the federal law were in effect, and the police nonetheless secured a warrant
and subsequently searched the Daily offices, the search would be illegal because the
material sought would not fall within the limited exception to the no-warrant rule. As
a result, liability could be imposed on the officer signing the affidavit that secured the
warrant and on the officers executing the search. Furthermore, had the search uncovered information leading to the identification and subsequent prosecution of the demonstrators who had attacked the police, the demonstrators would have standing to
move for exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence at trial.
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taining information of criminal activity, searches of the media
impede newsgathering and dissemination. The press' ability to
function is most seriously impaired when, in the course of a
search, the police are able to view confidential source
information.
Despite these problems with media searches, the United
States Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily rejected
the notion that the Constitution requires any special safeguards for the press. The Court found that the media would
be sufficiently protected under the Constitution if the fourth
amendment was applied with "scrupulous exactitude" by
magistrates issuing warrants for the search of news facilities.
The California Legislature, recognizing the need for
greater protection than that afforded by the Zurcher Court,
amended its penal code to require the use of a subpoena duces
tecum by police for obtaining information from the press. But
the limited reach and the uncertain application of the California law makes a no-warrant statute at the federal level
necessary.
The federal legislation proposed in this comment, limiting
media searches to a small number of specified circumstances,
would provide greater protection for the media than that
presently available under the federal Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Zurcher. The suggested statutory provisions would also give the press more protection
than the California legislation, in light of recent state court
interpretations of the state shield law. Federal legislation has
the additional advantage of providing national uniformity. In
addition, by requiring the use of a subpoena duces tecum, the
proposed legislation safeguards the interests of society and
the press in unfettered newsgathering and dissemination,
while insuring criminal investigations will not be hampered.
Stephanie Ann Christie

